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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES SINCE THE 20th SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

The situation in Satellite Eastern Europe during the past few months can perhaps best be characterized as one of uncertainty and ferment. Faced for the first time in their existences with open and consistent and influential forms of dissidence, several of the Communist regimes--most notably those of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary--have reacted with confusion and fear.

Caught off guard by the decisions of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, party leaders in these countries were apparently completely unprepared for the remarkable displays of open discontent with past policies exhibited by writers, students and party functionaries. The entire Communist apparatus of control seemingly stood by in temporary paralysis while students in Czechoslovakia publically demanded that their regimes haul down the Soviet flag and hired airplanes to spread their words throughout the state. In Poland, voices from within the party's intellectual ranks spoke up in disdain and demanded reform, and in Hungary, the party leader Rakosi, the very personification of the monolithic Communist state, was reduced to shrilling at little men who defied his edicts and called him a Judas to his face.

Although slow to react, the Politburos have now resumed the offensive. Ghab in Poland, Novotny in Czechoslovakia, Rakosi in Hungary, and even Gheorghiu-Dea in Rumania and Yugov in Bulgaria, have thundered at their critics and have promised that future

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transgressions of the all-septimate party line will no longer be tolerated. The party must, they all have said, reassert absolute control over its own ranks and over the writers and the dissident students. But prevented by Soviet policy from instituting a reign of terror, the tactics of a Stalin, the party leaders have had to make some small concessions to their opponents and have had to proceed with relative caution, relying more upon the weight of their words than on the strength of their police. The opposition has drawn back in reassessment, realizing that their original estimates of the change in Soviet policy were unduly optimistic, but the opposition has not as yet been fully cowed. The position of Rakosi in Hungary remains shaky and the forces arrayed against him appear to be growing; Ochab still faces a major fight with influential "right-wing" forces in Poland; and the ruling triumvirate in Czechoslovakia perhaps has yet to test its real strength against the dissident students and intellectuals of that country.

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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND SINCE THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence

Reaction in Poland to the 20th Soviet Party Congress and the denigration of Stalin has been more violent and has had more widespread effects than in any other Soviet bloc country.

A great many Poles, seeing in the decisions of the congress a "green light" for independent thought, responded with strong criticism of the regime and outspoken advocacy of greater freedom. Appearing in Poland's major publications, this criticism brought into the open the existence of serious discontent among party members and intellectuals with past policies. The population, too, was profoundly affected by the new developments. Some large factories were reportedly shaken by labor unrest, and, according to informants of the American embassy in Warsaw, Poland by mid-April was in "a state of real ferment."

In the face of the growing opposition, party leader Gchab was forced to warn publicly in late April that the attempts of "ideologically unstable" groups to take advantage of the increased freedom would not be tolerated. Although open criticism of public affairs has almost disappeared since early May, dissidence and discontent remain a major problem for the regime.

Party: Within the party, a liberalization of control and a more independent socialist course for Poland closely allied with the USSR is being urged by a number of influential functionaries. These "liberals" form a majority of the approximately 300 leading party functionaries in the central

Party Activ. Because this body is used by the politburo to keep in touch with party affairs throughout the country, it has been able to exert considerable pressure on the politburo. At the same time, by remaining largely anonymous and unorganized, it has avoided direct conflict with the hierarchy and thus is difficult to control.

The aims of the group have not been codified, but their principal goals appear to be: democratization of the party, to include genuinely free discussion and decentralization of authority; an increase in individual political security; and a real rise in standards of living.

Intellectuals: Members of communist writers and journalists reflecting both their own views and those of the liberal group, have spoken out openly against the regime. There have been demands for the resignation of the central committee and the holding of a party congress. At a meeting of newspaper editors, district party secretaries and factory managers, Eda Kerfol, chief editor of Izvestiia and wife of the editor of Tribuna Ledu, the party daily, declared she had lost faith in the party and regime.

Youth: Discontent also appears to be advanced among the youth who desire a new organization not controlled by the Communists. Elements within the youth groups have reportedly lost whatever respect for the party they may once have had. In late March, for example, 111 copies of one issue of the youth publication, So Prosti, were confiscated. The issue had

proposed the abolition of the communist youth organization because it lacked purpose and was corrupt.

Anti-Soviet: The discontent within the party has taken on some elements of anti-Soviet feeling. Polish contempt for Soviet ambassador Ponomarev is reportedly prevalent, and journalists and central committee members refer to him as a "perfect idiot." Khrushchev likewise is unpopular, is blamed for crimes in the Ukraine, and is held responsible for the present prominent position held by Polish party first secretary Gohab.

Destalinization

While attempting to keep the new developments within bounds, the regime has gone to great lengths to convince the Polish people that it is diverging itself from the excesses of Stalinism and launching a new era of legitimacy and reasonableness. The most dramatic step in this direction has been the dismissal of a number of high officials who were associated closely in the public mind with responsibility for the injustices of the Stalin era.

Dismissals: Dismissals by the regime began with the announcement of 20 April that the former public security chief, Stanislaw Radkiewicz, had been dismissed from his post as minister of state farms. Wit. Radkiewicz, the prosecutor general, the military prosecutor and the minister of justice were dismissed. The regime also removed the ministers of culture and foreign affairs and, finally, Deputy Premier Gorman,

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a politburo member who, as one of the former ruling triumvirate in Poland, was once among the most powerful of the Polish Communists.

The removal of Berman was a major step in the new leadership's efforts to establish firm control over the party and the government, and to appease party and popular dissidence.

Rehabilitations: To support further the impression that a new liberal group has supplanted the villains of the past, many former officials have been released with the admission that they were unjustly imprisoned. For such as Wladyslaw Gomulka, the former secretary general of the party who was ousted in 1948 for propounding a "Polish road" to socialism, former deputy defense minister Iwona, and longtime head of army intelligence Maciej Kozar, have been released.

Party membership was restored to some of these men, Kozar for instance, but in the case of Gomulka the regime has made clear that, although he was unjustly imprisoned, his views are still considered deviationist and he will not be readmitted to the party.

In addition to a rehabilitation of the living, the Polish regime has taken steps to clear the names of those who fell victim to Stalinist purges in the prewar period. Former leaders of Poland's prewar Communist Party who were executed or disappeared in the USSR during the great purges of the 1930's were lauded in the Polish press as persons "of stainless metal to which mud does not cling" who were victims of a "vile

provocation" which cost them their lives and "wanted to deprive them of revolutionary dignity."

Iron Curtain

The trend toward liberalization has been accompanied by an increased effort to make contact with the Western world. Steps were taken by Poland to ease travel restrictions that formerly had virtually barred American citizens from the country. Various favorable arrangements have been made by the official Polish travel agency to facilitate the visits of Western tourists to Poland, including quicker processing of visas and packaged tours at reasonable rates. A number of American tourists, mainly of Polish origin, have already taken the opportunity to visit Poland under the new arrangements.

Poland is also attempting to expand trade with Western countries and hopes to impress foreign buyers with the quality of Polish goods exhibited at the Poznan Fair between 17 June and 1 July. This fair is one of Poland's main hopes for establishing a reputation in international trade. Businessmen, tourists and newspapermen, as well as top-level representatives, from Western countries will probably be encouraged to visit Poland in greater numbers.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence

According to the remarkable public statement of a top Czechoslovakian leader and Communist theoretician, the 20th Soviet Party Congress resulted in the "simultaneous appearance" of "great internal ferment" within the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. The regime has been forced to warn that although some changes will be made, the party line has been basically correct and continued transgressions will not be tolerated.

Students: Open dissidence has been displayed most conspicuously by two groups, party intellectuals and university students. The May Day parade of students in Prague, which reportedly resulted in the arrest of about 30 student leaders, was marked by an unprecedented degree of anti-state criticism expressed by slogans and posters. Students have presented to regime officials resolutions calling for reforms such as academic freedom, freedom of the press, an end to radio jamming and a cessation of the party's worship of the USSR. The demonstrations and demands have not been confined to Prague. Well-organized protests occurred simultaneously in several urban centers during May, with contact between student groups maintained by motorcycle and airplane courier. Obviously frightened by these unexpected developments, the party leaders have vigorously rejected the student demands and appealed to university professors for aid in combating student dissidence.

Writers: Criticism of the party has also been strongly voiced by Czech writers many of whom viewed the CPSU decisions as a cue for the expression of open discontent. In June, acting belatedly, the regime vigorously attacked the writers for "unprincipled liberalism" and anti-regime slander. The hierarchy, disclaiming any intentions of police interference, has called upon the writers' union to prevent further outbreaks.

Party: The party has also been faced with growing restlessness at provincial levels. Apparently unable to give clear policy directives concerning implementation of congress directives, the party leaders had to stand by while local party organizations held meetings and criticized the hierarchy. Such men as propaganda boss Kopecky and Slovak party leader Hecilek were reportedly condemned openly in these meetings, which were reportedly characterized in general by confusion and discontent. The recent statements of party leaders indicate that attempts are now being made to end the period of the "soft line" and relative inactivity. The hierarchy is clearly attempting to reassert its authority and establish a firm line before open dissidence extends to the public.

Destalinization

Dismissals: With customary caution, the Czech regime delayed open criticism of Stalin until the beginning of April when first secretary Antonin Novotny declared Czech involvement in Stalinist-type excesses. Soon after, the late Czech president

Gottwald was mildly criticized for permitting a cult of personality to grow up around him, and Defense Minister Alexander Kepicka was removed from office and from the politburo for allegedly developing a cult of personality around himself in the army.

Following the conclusion of the June party conference, Minister of Culture Stail was dismissed, possibly because of open opposition to him by writers and other intellectuals and because he may be viewed by the party as a convenient scapegoat. Minister of Light Industry Hales was also dismissed, as was Prosecutor General Vachav Alex, who had been prominent in the prosecution of the January trial. Other dismissals do not appear imminent, although such men as Vice Premier Kopecky and Slovak party boss Stelich are certainly vulnerable to charges of Stalinist errors.

Release: Milos Hajek an attorney in Moscow in Bulgaria, Rudolf Slansky, the main figure in Czechoslovakia's 1952 purge trial, is not to be rehabilitated. Instead, he has emerged as the principal scapegoat for some of the regime's past errors, including the violation of "socialist legality" and the introduction of illegal security methods.

However, the regime has recently released many of those imprisoned in connection with the January trial. One of three defendants who was not executed, Armin London, has been released, and the cases of the two others are reportedly under

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review. The regime has not announced a new general amnesty, claiming that since 1953 almost 24,000 persons had been released from imprisonment by amnesty decrees. A commission has been established, however, to review past trials for instances of legal violations, thus permitting the regime to free those "illegally" imprisoned and place the blame for their arrest on Slansky and his group.

Concessions: The regime has also promised certain reforms to organizations such as youth groups and trade unions, a return to socialist legality in the security and justice organs, and certain extensive administrative reforms, including widespread decentralization and greater responsibility for lower party organs. In an apparent attempt to placate Slovak nationalism, which seems to have gained upon the current confusion to manifest itself openly, Slovakia has been singled out in particular for greater responsibility in policy matters.

Iron Curtain

Although extremely active even before the Soviet 26th Party Congress in renewing contacts with Western countries, the Czech regime since February has taken additional steps to repair strained relations with selected European nations. Most important have been the recent request by Premier Siroky for a state invitation to Paris and somewhat belated attempts to accelerate rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The regime has termed all charges or accusations made against Slansky

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in his trial as false and has granted Yugoslavia a \$73,000,000 trade credit. Czechoslovakia has delayed its reconciliation with Yugoslavia possibly because of genuine reluctance and because of confusion as to how to effect this change without creating further internal problems.

In early June, Czech engineers began dismantling some of the barbed wire barriers along the Austro-Czech border, presumably as a positive gesture that the "iron curtain" between the two countries need not be such a literal fact in the future.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY SINCE THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence

Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party SED, was the first Satellite leader to denounce Stalin. In a Neues Deutschland article on 4 March he made his now famous statement that Stalin could no longer be considered a classical Marxist, and by 17 March he had progressed to the point of calling Stalin a liar and a falsifier of history.

Party: These attacks, coming from a man who had been described as "Stalin's most faithful pupil," caused considerable consternation, confusion and unrest in the party, particularly among the younger members who had been taught to revere Stalin as the infallible interpreter of Marxism.

This reaction was manifested in attacks on the party leadership, particularly Ulbricht and in stepped-up activity by dissident elements within the party; new party dogma. In an SED meeting in East Berlin one young party member stated that he felt offended by Ulbricht's remarks. He complained that he did not see how Ulbricht could reproach young party members for not knowing Lenin and for having read only Stalin's works. He went on to say that he had not found it particularly interesting to read Stalin's political and economic treatises, but the directives to do so had come from the SED central committee and, in the last analysis, from Ulbricht. He concluded therefore, that Ulbricht should not reproach young party

members for having read only Stalin.

Many party members have pointed to Ulbricht's own close association with Stalinism and noted that he was guilty of many things now condemned by the party. They consider Ulbricht discredited and cannot understand why he should retain his high party post.

To a great many SED members, the new line also meant freedom to question and criticize party directives and decisions, and perhaps to modify them. He was even brought up short, however. The party newspaper Neues Deutschland, on 31 May condemned this erroneous viewpoint. It said that collective leadership does not mean that party members may discuss party decisions from above before circulating them out. This is a false concept of democracy within the party which ignores the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and, if permitted, could only damage party discipline.

Rehabilitation

No changes have occurred in East German party or government leadership since the Soviet Congress, and there has been no rehabilitation of purged East German Communists. On 30 April Premier Grotenski told a student group that all elements of the personality cult had been eliminated by 1983, and that since East Germany had had no "Kaja or Koster trials," there was no need for drastic corrective measures.

The party leadership, however, has called for various measures to safeguard the rights of citizens and to eliminate

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all infringements of the rule of law. Grotowski, at the third SED congress in late March, took to task the minister of justice and the public prosecutor for their illegal methods of investigation and prosecution, alleging that many persons had been convicted unjustly. A Commission for Developing Democracy on a Broad Basis" was set up to investigate judicial abuses and recommend new procedures to ensure the protection of accused persons.

Releases: Four groups of persons, totaling probably 1,000, have been released. The first group, whose release was announced on 27 April, consisted of 86 former officials and party members who were described by the East German press as "persons who had been sentenced because of violations of the laws." The other groups consisted of persons sentenced by Soviet military or East German courts for "crimes committed in connection with the Hitler war"; prisoners turned over to East Germany by the Soviet Union; and "persons sentenced on account of their activity for various foreign or West German agent centers who assert they belong to the SPD." The most prominent figures released to date have been former justice minister Max Fechner and former state secretary Paul Schneider of the Ministry for Trade and Supply.

The releases are the regime's only positive moves to correct past injustices and are clearly linked to the attacks on the Ministry of Justice. The Communists undoubtedly also had in

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mind the effect the releases would have on the West, particularly West Germany. The East German regime appears willing to make concessions of this sort to counter the validity of Western charges of injustice in East Germany and to reduce East German resentment against the regime.

Iron Curtain:

Since the 20th party congress, East Germany has continued its efforts to increase its contacts with the West, though there have been no special efforts to encourage tourist traffic as there has been in Poland or the Soviet Union. It is particularly interested in contacts with West Germany and continues to maintain a relatively mild attitude toward such matters as freedom of travel across the East-West German border and cultural exchanges.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY SINCE THE 19TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence

The directives of the Soviet Party Congress and subsequent developments in Eastern Europe have had a profound effect on the Hungarian party. Members have taken advantage of the state of relaxation called for by the CPSU to express their outright opposition to certain party policies and to personalities within the top party leadership, particularly party first secretary Matyas Rakosi. The congress, in effect, undermined much of the work Rakosi had done to overcome factionalism and to reassert party discipline and control since the ouster of premier Nagy for rightist deviationism in April 1955.

Faced with this threat to his continuance in power, Rakosi has sought and received Khrushchev's endorsement of his leadership. This has not, however, succeeded in solving the factionalism question, and Soviet party presidium member Suslov visited Budapest from 6 to 14 June presumably in an attempt to settle the fight one way or the other.

Intellectuals The most pointed and fearless condemnation of Rakosi's leadership has emanated from intellectuals, who have called for more liberal policies in the cultural fields. Writers, for example, have demanded permission to have contacts with the West in order to prevent the withering away of Hungarian literature. At a 30 March

meeting of the Hungarian Writers' Association, several writers attacked Kadar for his "unbridled demagoguery." One speaker, Sándor Lukácsy, said that Kadar's statement rehabilitating Rák was "worthy of Judas." Another speaker proposed that a memorandum be sent to the central committee demanding Kadar's immediate removal. Meetings of party members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Hungarian radio staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs displayed a similar spirit of dissatisfaction and reluctance to accept party discipline.

Party: A central committee meeting held shortly after the congress reportedly took place in an atmosphere of violence and recrimination against party leader Kadar and ended inconclusively. Central committee discussion on the Rák rehabilitation reportedly degenerated into open revolt, with Kadar being termed Rák's "murderer." This discussion among high party leaders was mirrored in subsequent meetings of lower level party activists. At a March meeting of party activists in a Budapest district for example, an unnamed man criticized Kadar to his face and asked him to resign.

Opposition to Kadar has been gathering in recent months around a moderate group, a younger more "national-type" Communists within the party leadership—including the central committee. This group is reportedly headed by

politburo members Kovacs and local secretary János Kadar, who had been ousted from the politburo in 1959 in the wake of the Rákj Titoist trial. Others, including politburo and secretariat member Szalai and Colonel General Hegradi (the head of Agitprop), appear sympathetic to the anti-Rákosi opposition and may be attempting to negotiate between the extremes in both groups. Anti-Rákosi elements suffered a blow in 1955 when Nagy, who apparently symbolized the opposition, was ousted. These circumstances now lead them to believe that recent events indicate that the USSR is willing to grant broader authority over internal political matters to the satellite parties. Bulgarian premier Chervenkov's ouster by the Bulgarian central committee supports the belief among this element that Rákosi, who is open to similar charges, can also be ousted by central committee action.

The philosophical premises of the anti-Rákosi forces are not clearly defined, and they seem to have been united initially in large part by their opposition to Rákosi's personal leadership. A number of the leading political figures in this group are undoubtedly staunch Communists who intend to stay in the socialist camp but desire a somewhat more liberal domestic policy (in literature, press, education, and cultural relations). Much of the support of the 'reliable' moderate elements, however, comes from a group in the party whose

adherence to basic ideology and, at best, be considered questionable. Attempts to control by the moderate might generate additional pressure for an unstrained move to the right--which would be apparent not only in Hungary but throughout the satellites.

Popular reaction: Reaction to the party congress by the populace has been limited to date. The population at large apparently has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. If the regime grants any significant concessions, however, the usually volatile Hungarian population can be expected to press for more.

Destalinization:

Hungarian commentary, particularly by party leader Rakosi, has been extensive since the congress and reflects the top leadership's efforts to explain the new policies with the least possible disruption to party supremacy, particularly Rakosi's supremacy in the party. Throughout the three months since Rakosi's initial report to the congress from 14 to 15 March, specific criticisms of Malin has been moderate. The correctness of "Leninist Communism" and the importance of party control have been prominent themes in the press. After initially tossing the blame to others, Rakosi in May admitted that he too had been personally guilty of tolerating and often supporting the cult of personality, as well as permitting violations of socialist legality by others.

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The anti-Rakosi party membership, feeling this mild confession completely inadequate, has continued to press for further concessions and appears to be well aware of Rakosi's precarious position.

Rehabilitations and releases One of Rakosi's first moves, to comply with the new policies dictated by the Soviet congress, was to announce on 27 March that Laslo Rajk, former foreign minister who was purged and executed as a Titoist in 1949, had been falsely accused. The rehabilitation of Rajk, who fell in ^{fact} largely as a result of a factional fight with Rakosi, stimulated rather than quelled opposition elements. The regime's rehabilitation program has also included the freeing of virtually all imprisoned social democrats, many minority party leaders, including Bela Kovacs, the former Smallholders Party secretary who vigorously opposed the communist takeover. Archbishop Greenz has also been released and has been re-instated as chairman of the Roman Catholic Branch of Bishops.

Concessions Rakosi has made other moves or gestures to give an appearance of compliance with the demands for more liberal domestic policies. Many of these changes were suggested in his 18 May semi-official speech to party activists and have been introduced as measures by the Council of Ministers. These include steps designed to improve labor conditions, to eliminate the excesses of bureaucracy and centralism, and to establish expanded popular

front activities. These "concessions," although possibly designed to increase popular support for the regime, were in part, probably forced on him by the demanding opposition.

In an effort to conform with the Soviet congress and curry increased popular support for regime policies, the Hungarians, as well as certain other East European nations, have propagandized certain changes which are to take place. These include a strengthening of the function and representative nature of the national assembly, fostering of more criticism, more creativity in literature, improved church-state relations and a limited relaxation of the more overt aspects of the police function. The general confusion in the Hungarian party as to how far the Soviet leaders want such a trend to go in order to demonstrate the new period of "relaxation" may cause party leaders to err on the side of excessive liberality, and may foster the development of popular pressures for real and greater concessions.

Iron Curtain

In the international field, the Hungarians have publicly initiated removal of security barriers on the Austrian border, although new blocks are being established behind the original barriers in some sectors. The Hungarian government has also pushed for closer cultural and trade relations with free world countries, including the United States.

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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA SINCE THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence:

The results of the 20th Soviet Party Congress have caused speculation and confusion in the Romanian party and apparently have brought into the open an ideological split at the lower party levels.

Intellectuals: Certain elements have utilized the discussion of the congress as a means to express their "liberalist" sentiments. The opposition has been vocalized largely by literary and artistic leaders directly the subject of regime attack. These intellectuals' activities are, however, apparently fewer in number than their counterparts in Poland and Hungary and, to date, the party has been able to use the writers' organization itself to combat open dissidence.

Party: Within the party hierarchy there is reportedly a group composed largely of opportunists who allegedly feel that since Gheorghiu-Dej is bound to suffer in the de-Stalinization campaign, they can assume increased powers. This group, if indeed it exists at all, may be headed by First Vice-Premier Bodnaras, who is considered to be more Moscow-oriented than the "nationalist" Gheorghiu-Dej. Bodnaras reportedly is also at personal odds with Gheorghiu-Dej, and the two men allegedly came to blows last April at a dinner in a public café. A middle party group of "technocrats," consisting primarily of functionaries rather than political activists, may not be in active support of Gheorghiu-Dej but

is unlikely to become embroiled in party factionalism at this time.

The top leadership appears stable, although Deputy Premier Dumitru Petrescu, an old-time communist who was trained in the USSR during the 1930's and a comparatively light-weight, was ousted on 7 May. A possible connection to political member Iosif Chisinevski, party ideologist and chief since World War II, who was reportedly condemned recently at a party meeting for his alleged insistence on fitting Romanian culture into the Soviet mold.

Popular reaction: The popular reaction to the Soviet party congress and subsequent developments has basically been one of "wait and see." The direction of the changes are probably viewed as encouraging, but so far little has happened in Romania to suggest that the individual's lot will be materially improved in the near future.

Centralization

The regime, asserting that the principles of the Soviet congress have already been instituted, has devoted comparatively limited attention to a re-evaluation of Stalin and the danger of the cult of personality.

Dismissals: The regime has, nevertheless, taken measures which appear designed to reassert "socialist legality" and put back the operation and function of Romanian security forces. In May, State Auditor Victor Ionescu was dismissed and General Alexandru Petrescu, head of the Bucharest Military Tribunal, reportedly lost his position. A reduction in the active personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs--one

report suggests that there will be a 11 percent reduction in the total security force--was announced on 8 June.

Releases: The regime has also released all imprisoned social democrats, a number of other minority party figures, and most important Zionist leaders. The regime does not appear, however, to feel it necessary to rehabilitate Ben Packer, Vasile Luca or Teohari Gharghese who were purged in 1952 primarily because of a factional split within the party, although ostensibly for deviationism. Rehabilitation of these figures presumably would only exacerbate the problems of party discipline and control.

Iron Curtain

In a partial relaxation of some of the "iron-curtain" aspects of the present regime, Romania has pushed for greater East-West contacts, particularly with the United States. The Yugoslav minister suggested in March that close relations between Romania and the West in all fields might have the result of getting Romania used to relying on others than the Soviets for basic needs. The Romanian government has effected a de facto relaxation on travel by Westerners, particularly on unofficial travel. Presumably as a reflection of Romanian policy, the average Romanian citizen appears to feel somewhat more at ease in direct contacts with Westerners.

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MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN BULGARIA SINCE THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS

Dissidence

The two spectacular post-Stalinist Party Congress developments in Bulgaria--the demotion of premier and former strong man Vasil Kheremchev and the posthumous rehabilitation of the major victim of "Titelist" charges, Traicho Kostov--have not been followed by any significant changes in policy under the new premier, Anton Yugov. Some intellectuals and party members, however, are apparently making strong demands for a liberalization of internal policies, and the regime's concern over dissidence within the party appears to be growing.

The party press has condemned certain intellectuals for "unsound tendencies and the voicing of 'petty bourgeois' slogans about freedom of action, freedom of criticism and freedom of the press." It has also attacked the Sofia party organization for harboring bourgeois unstable elements who try to slander Marxism-Leninism and discredit party policy.

This "liberal" dissidence may be limited to relatively small groups who speak with a loud voice. Bulgaria, in contrast with some of the other satellites, may however have more trouble with those party members who prefer a strong "leftist" approach than with those looking for a milder Leninism. All of Bulgaria's post-Stalin "new course" policies have been relatively hesitant and have involved only relatively small changes, presumably because of a tendency on the part of many, or most, Bulgarian

Communists to proceed in a rather brutal, Stalin fashion.

Destalinization

While Kofin was initially slow to discuss the de-Stalinization aspect of the Soviet congress, it eventually pointed the guilty finger at its own premier for having fostered a cult around himself, thus seriously harming the welfare of the government which led to violations of "socialist legality." This appeared to tie Chervenev to the trial and execution of Bulgaria's "Titoist" victim, Traicho Kostov, who was rehabilitated at the Bulgarian Communist Party central committee session in early April.

Although there is little doubt that Chervenev was one of the most Stalinist of all the East European Communist leaders--even to the point of close imitation of Stalin's dress--it appears probable that his ouster was largely the result of old party factional problems. Yugov and Kostov were the leaders of the "activist" group of Bulgarian communists--those who spent prewar and war years in Bulgaria--as opposed to Chervenev and his supporters, most of whom were in Moscow in this period. Yugov switched sides at the time of Stalin's downfall to save his own skin, albeit with a demoted status. Although Chervenev supporters still remain at the top level of the regime, the balance has shifted somewhat.

There is no evidence that the "activist" faction has been particularly pro-Yugoslav or pro-East, but they apparently want more consideration given to their country's national interests.

Yugov's actions and statements since assuming power, however, have not yet indicated any shifts in Bulgarian policy, either internally or with respect to Moscow.

With the rehabilitation of Kosterov, Bulgaria has now dealt with most of its past trials and retributions. Since Stalin's death most opposition leaders have been released, as well as many of the other people implicated with Kosterov. Some of these latter have attained relatively high positions in the regime. There has, however, been no attempt to rehabilitate Nikola Petkov, Bulgarian National Agrarian Party leader executed in 1947, whose prosecution was directed by Yugov, who at that time was Minister of Interior.

Iron Curtain

Bulgaria has ended the usual statements about desiring contacts with all nations. Sofia's main efforts have been directed toward improving its diplomatic relations, particularly with Greece. In addition, Sofia in February proposed the re-establishment of relations with the United States.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIA SINCE THE 10th SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
Dissidence

Unlike the other Satellites, there have been no changes in Albania's policies or leadership since the Soviet Party Congress, and presumably because of this lack of "thaw," open popular and party dissidence apparently has not increased. The regime's extreme reluctance to make any changes suggests that its leaders are concerned over the congress' possible consequences for Albania, especially in respect to its relations with Yugoslavia.

De Stalinization

Comment on the derogation of Stalin and the cult of personality has been extremely limited. While the Albanian leaders have admitted that there have been unwholesome examples of the practice of the cult of personality in Albania, no names have been mentioned. Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha has said that all problems arising from this error were eliminated in July 1954. At that time he gave the government leadership to Premier Mehmet Shehu and retained only party leadership.

Although there has been some reshuffling of upper party and governmental positions, and a desire apparently to grant at least an appearance of wider leadership, none of the changes appears significant.

In sharp contrast to current bloc policy, the regime has made no significant concessions to Yugoslavia and apparently has no intention of rehabilitating its Titoist victim Koci Xoxe.

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At the Albanian Party Congress (25 May - 3 June), Hoxha re-emphasized that all the charges against Koxe were "completely supported by the facts." This adamant position probably stems from a fear that any gestures towards Tito would encourage Yugoslavia to attempt to reassert the leading role it held in Albania before the 1948 Yugoslav-Communist break. Although the Yugoslavs have publicly condemned Hoxha and the Albanian leadership for their attitude, the USSR has apparently endorsed Hoxha's position. Moscow itself is probably reluctant to risk the threat of renewed Yugoslav influence in Albania.

Iron Curtain

The regime has repeatedly called for contacts with the free world in all areas of endeavor, but has succeeded only in establishing governmental relations with a few Western, Near Eastern and African countries. It continues to strive for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, Britain and Greece. The only cultural inroad from the West has been the Albanian purchase of the Gino Lollabrigada-type Italian movie films.

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6 copies

Summary of Recent CS Reports on the Satellites

For: DDP-Mr. Frank Wisner

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